Friday, June 8, 2012


The development of Greek weapons programs during the past two decades has significantly contributed (either directly or indirectly) to the fact that presently the country is in a difficult economic situation. Greece proved to be incapable not only to resist the growing poverty, but also to manage its military prowess (in comparison with the sums, which they spent between 1990's and 2000) all by the increasing military tension, caused by the actions of Turkey both in the Aegean sea, and in the eastern Mediterranean.

After the Greek-Turkish crisis in January 1996 for Athens became an obvious need for a defensive system that could become an obstacle to Turkey's revisionist policies pursued in the so-called "gray zones" in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. First of all, aggravation that arose on the Imiya Islans in January 1996, revealed the political problems that developed later in the "malignant tumor" and became one of the causes of economic disaster in 2009 followed by a geopolitical poverty that now faces Greece. The need to strengthen the country's military has become an occasion for political opportunists who were enriched by Greek taxpayers, playing the role of "mediators" between multinational defence giants and the Ministry of National Defense of Greece. As a result, the Greek defense policy involved dozens of offshore companies and bank accounts in the country and abroad, through which laundered "black money" received by bribery, as well as intermediary organizations (government, labor, etc.) that contributed to the process generally, and of course, friendly states (eg Germany), used the black holes for economic blackmail... "impending death of the Greek national sovereignty." Of course, we must not forget the invaluable "contribution" of Goldman Sachs, which has transported, and in fact concealed huge sums spent on armaments, with the help of its "indisputable scientific method" that is, the talented use of so-called swaps.

Scandals, aggravating the situation of Greek economy, with usurious interest rates, high rate swaps (which up to now, Germany allegedly never notice, trying to buy everything for "penny") have deep economic and ideological roots. Consequently, it is impossible, first, to identify all organizations that participated in this "feast" and to analyze their work (note that the judicial authorities until the writing of this article has not yet managed to identify all cases of corruption). Thus, the purpose of this analysis is to define the boundaries in which there exists criminal organizations that are causing economic damage to the Hellenic Republic, directly or indirectly, the applied nature of justice, and of course, it is impossible to ignore - the geopolitical resonance.

Readers are requested to visit the links that I have mentioned, wherever possible. I have tried my best but reader’s comments will ultimately judge the info I have used while writing this article.

The Hunt for the Greek "Red October"

Greek corruption in defense spending in true Hollywood scale is admittedly a submarine scandal namely project 214 associated with the activities of shipyard Hellenic Shipyards in Scaramanga (ENAE). The case, which began in the late 1990s. It was like a TV series, and then turned into a thriller, a Hollywood blockbuster like "The Hunt for the" Red October "," with Sean Connery in the title role. In Greek’s version a failed primary role was played by former minister of national defense under the government of Costas Simitis, Akis Tsohadzopulos.

Negotiations for the construction of German submarines Project 214 began in 1996 and culminated in the signing of the contract 012B/2000, providing for the construction of four submarines, one of which (Papanikolis) was built in Germany at the shipyard HDW in Kiel and the other three were built at the shipyard ENAE (program "Archimedes"). Additionally, after signing the contract 021B/2002 the same German and Greek companies have undertaken repair and modernization of the old Greek Navy submarine project 209/1200 such as Poseidon class submarines (the program Neptune II). Minister of National Defence was then Yiannos Papandoniu.

Before you embark on a maze of huge amounts of bribes and who lost the Greek state, we must highlight some technical issues relating to discussion of submarines. Need for Project 214 submarines arose from the need to dive to depths greater than in the Baltic Sea, which is common in the Aegean Sea. Project 214 submarines are specially modified to give the submarine better hydrodynamic characteristics and acoustic stealth. What makes these submarines advanced and makes the potential buyer happy - it has air independent power plant (AIP), based on the technology of electrochemical generator using fuel cells developed by Siemens.

On the submarine project 214, the negotiations leading up to an agreement, first, as it turned out, were not transparent, and secondly, did not bring any specific compensating benefits, given the huge cost of the contract, except for the promises of new technologies, jobs, economic cooperation, etc. etc. The tender was in "extreme urgency", and the powers were immediately transferred to the German company Forestall (now in the TKMS).  Subsequently, in 2009, Neptune II has been changed; it now only included the modernization of a single Greek submarine of the project 209/1200 and the purchase of two new submarines of Project 214 instead of the modernization of two other submarines of Project 209/1200.

In this connection a natural question arises: how is it possible that the Greek Navy urgently needed weapons, and the contract of 1999 assigned delivery of submarines within five years, but actually the primary submarine (Papanikolis) was delivered in December 21, 2010? Secondly, according to what calculations it was more profitable to buy more submarines of Project 214 than to repair existing submarines? Third, why, despite the fact that the French company DCN, in collaboration with the Spanish Navantia proposed a lower cost of the project, providing submarine Scorpene, ultimately, preference was given to the Project 214 submarines?

The above questions were the starting point of legal thriller, which reached its peak in 2011 through publications in international journals such as Der Spiegel.

As it became clear from interviews with former Director General of the Defence investment and armament of Greece Evangelos Vasilakosom on Greek television channel. He discussed the preliminary cost of the project 214 submarines in 1996, when the negotiations began, was 924 million euros for four units. The proposal of the company in 1999 was 1.2 billion euros for three submarines, and when in 2002 Greece has ordered a fourth, the cost had risen to 1.7 billion euros! That is, in 2002 the damage (at least visible) for Greek taxpayers was approximately 800 million euros.


During the reign of the "New Democracy" in 1989-1993. Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis took three attempts to sell the shipyard (ENAE), but none of them succeeded. This desperate drama continued until in 2002, the HDW shipyard together with Ferrostaal bought Hellenic Shipyards for 6 million euros & thus the Germans struck cruelly, so disappointing for Greece. To put it concretely, the then Government did not respect even simple conventions, signing on the same day, the extension of the "Neptune II” (modernization of three submarines of Project 209/1200 and the implementation of the option to build the fourth submarine Project 214 submarines), and to contract for the sale of ENAE shipyards.

Poder Naval |

Written by Ioncube Khanz


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